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Abstract
We consider a monopolist seller facing a single buyer with additive valuations over
n heterogeneous, independent items. It is known that in this important setting optimal
mechanisms may require randomization [11], use menus of infinite size [8], and may be
computationally intractable [7]. This has sparked recent interest in finding simple mech-
anisms that obtain reasonable approximations to the optimal revenue [9, 14, 2]. In this
work we attempt to find the optimal simple mechanism.
There are many ways to define simple mechanisms. Here we restrict our search to
partition mechanisms, where the seller partitions the items into disjoint bundles and posts
a price for each bundle; the buyer is allowed to buy any number of bundles.
We give a PTAS for the problem of finding a revenue-maximizing partition mechanism,
and prove that the problem is strongly NP-hard. En route, we prove structural properties
of near-optimal partition mechanisms which may be of independent interest: for example,
there always exists a near-optimal partition mechanism that uses only a constant number
of non-trivial bundles (i.e. bundles with more than one item).
˚UC Berkeley. I am grateful to Alon Eden, Amos Fiat, and Muli Safra for inspiring discussions. I also
thank Jason Hartline, Christos Papadimitriou, Paul Tylkin, and anonymous reviewers for helpful comments
on previous versions of this manuscript. Most of this research was done while the author was an intern
at Microsoft Research New England. Part of this research was supported by NSF grant CCF1408635 and
Templeton Foundation grant 3966.
1 Introduction
Designing revenue-maximizing mechanisms for a seller who faces a single buyer with addi-
tive valuations over n heterogeneous, independent items is a fundamental problem in auction
theory. It is known that even in this simple setting, the optimum mechanism requires ran-
domization [11], uses a menu of infinite size [8], and may be computationally intractable [7].
Such mechanisms are often considered “impractical”: buyers and sellers may be reluctant
to participate in mechanisms that are too complicated; randomization may be restricted by
legal requirements (and by our poor understanding of risk aversion); describing and choosing
among infinite menus raises obvious issues of communication and computational complexity,
etc. Put in computer science jargon, simplicity is a constraint: just like the auctioneer
cannot obtain the entire social welfare because of incentive compatibility constraints, the
optimum mechanism’s revenue is infeasible because of the simplicity constraint.
In recent years there have been many works comparing simple mechanisms to optimal
mechanisms (including [12, 1, 17, 16, 3]). In particular, a line of works [9, 14, 2] in our setting
(a single buyer with additive valuations over independent items) culminated with a celebrated
1{6-approximation of the optimal revenue by the better of the following two mechanisms: (a)
sell each item separately; and (b) auction all the items together as one grand bundle. Here,
rather than comparing to the benchmark of the globally optimal (but infeasible) auction,
we want to find the best feasible mechanism. Clearly, the above mechanism also obtains a
1{6-approximation of the optimal simple mechanism; but can we do better?
Can we find the optimal simple mechanism?
Alas, it is not clear how to formalize “simple”. In this work we propose partition mecha-
nisms as a standard for simplicity. (In a partition mechanisms the seller partitions the set of
items into disjoint bundles, and posts a price for each bundle; the buyer is allowed to select
any number of bundles.) In Section 2 we discuss some of the reasons that made us choose
this definition, as well as some of its imperfections. We want to emphasize that the same
question could be asked with respect to any definition of “simple”. (For example: what is the
computational complexity of finding the optimal deterministic mechanism with polynomial
(additive)-menu-size?)
Our technical contributions include a PTAS, i.e. for any constant δ ą 0, we give a poly-
nomial time algorithm that finds a partition mechanism that obtains p1´ δq-approximation
to the optimal revenue among all partition mechanisms. Rather than developing novel al-
gorithmic techniques, our main tool is exploring the structural properties of near-optimal
partitions. For example, we prove that there exists a near-optimal partition mechanism with
only a constant number of non-trivial bundles. We also prove that this problem is strongly
NP-hard, i.e. there is no FPTAS (assuming P ‰ NP).
Organization In Section 2 we discuss some of the merits of partition mechanisms. In
Section 4 we give a few interesting examples and provide some intuition for the technical
part. The NP-hardness result appears in Section 5 and the PTAS in Section 6.
1.1 Related work
We briefly discuss a few related works on computational complexity of designing simple,
revenue-(near)-optimal mechanisms in settings with independent item valuations. For a con-
stant number (or many i.i.d.) additive buyers with monotone hazard rate (MHR) valuation
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distributions, Cai and Huang [5] give a PTAS to the optimal mechanism. (Note that we
make no assumption on the distributions except independence.) Cai and Huang’s mechanism
is simple in the sense that most items are sold as a single bundle, but for the remaining few
items an arbitrary (potentially randomized) mechanism is used. Our restriction to partition
mechanisms for an additive buyer has an analog of item-pricing mechanisms for a unit-demand
buyer. For the latter, Cai and Daskalakis [4] give a PTAS for monotone hazard rate valua-
tions and a Quasi-PTAS for regular valuations, and finding the exact optimum for general
valuations is NP-hard by Chen et al. [6].
2 Partition mechanisms as simple mechanisms
While there have been notable attempts to quantify complexity of different mechanisms (e.g.
by Hart and Nisan [10] and recently by Morgenstern and Roughgarden [15]), it is fair to
say that we have not seen an indisputable, universal definition of simple mechanisms. Most
likely, because “simple” can and shouldmean different things in different settings; for example,
compare the simplicity desiderata in the following scenarios: selling produce in a grocery store
(buyers are limited in time and computational capacity); spectrum auctions (buyers may be
limited by legal constraints); and ad-auctions in an online marketplace (decisions are often
made by automated algorithms).
In this work we define simple mechanisms as partition mechanisms. Certainly, there are
issues with this definition. One immediate problem with restricting to partition mechanisms
is that they don’t really capture all simple mechanisms. In particular, see Example 3 for
a distribution where a simple, deterministic mechanism that is not a partition mechanism
obtains a strictly greater revenue. More importantly, some of the advantages of partition
mechanisms listed in this section are restricted to a single buyer, with additive valuations, over
independent items; this issue is illustrated in Example 4 which shows that for many buyers
with additive valuations over independent items, partition mechanisms achieve a revenue
much lower than the optimum. Coming up with a canonical definition for simple mechanisms
remains one of the most important open problems in this line of work. Nevertheless, in this
section we argue that partition mechanisms have many advantages as the standard for simple
mechanisms in this particular setting.
Expressiveness We argue that despite their simplicity, partition mechanisms can be used
to express important auctions of interest. For example, they generalize both selling items
separately and bundling all the items together; thus by [2] they guarantee at least a 1{6-
approximation to the optimal revenue achievable with any mechanism. Furthermore, this is
a strong generalization: as we show in Example 1, partition mechanisms can obtain as much
as double the revenue obtained by the better of selling items separately or bundling all the
items together. Also, we note partition mechanisms can exhibit rich structure, as is evident
by our NP-hardness result.
Menu complexity and false-name-proofness Hart and Nisan [10] discuss a measure of
menu-size complexity: every truthful mechanism can be represented as a menu of (poten-
tially randomized) outcomes and prices, where the buyer is allowed to choose one of those
outcomes. As noted by Hart and Nisan, the mechanism which auctions each item separately
has exponential menu-size complexity under this definition. To overcome this problem, they
also introduce a measure additive-menu-size, where the buyer is allowed to buy an arbitrary
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number of outcomes from the menu. Under this definition, partition auctions have linear
additive-menu-size complexity.
A related issue is that of false-name-proofness, i.e. can a buyer gain from participating
in the mechanism several times? Partition mechanisms (and additive-menu mechanisms in
general) have the advantage that they are always false-name-proof.
Locality and buyer-side computational complexity Partition mechanisms also have
the advantage that the buyer’s decisions are “local”, i.e. the decision to buy one bundle
is independent of the decision to buy other bundles. This greatly simplifies tasks such as
analyzing and reasoning about such mechanisms, learning or predicting the effects of changes
to the environment or the mechanism, etc. In particular, this makes the buyer’s decisions
very easy.
Revenue monotonicity Hart and Reny [11] observed an interesting phenomenon they call
revenue non-monotonicity, where increasing the buyer’s valuations (in the sense of stochastic
dominance), may strictly decrease the optimal obtainable revenue. Hart and Reny showed
a constant factor gap between the revenue obtainable with the higher and lower valuations,
even when selling two i.i.d. items. Furthermore, [16] recently observed that for two items with
correlated valuations, this gap may be infinite. Another nice property of partition mechanisms
is that the maximum revenue obtainable by auctions in this class is revenue-monotone.
3 Preliminaries
For any distribution ~D of valuations, we use the following notation, mostly due to [9, 2], to
denote the optimum revenue for each class of mechanisms:
• Rev
´
~D
¯
- the maximum revenue among all truthful mechanisms;
• DRev
´
~D
¯
- the maximum revenue among all truthful deterministic mechanisms;
• PRev
´
~D
¯
- the maximum revenue among all truthful partition mechanisms;
• BRev
´
~D
¯
- the maximum revenue obtainable by auctioning the grand bundle; and
• SRev
´
~D
¯
- the maximum revenue obtainable by pricing each item separately.
When ~D is clear from the context, we simply write Rev,DRev, etc.
4 Techniques, intuition, and examples
We begin our technical exposition with the following example which separates the revenue
obtainable with a partition mechanism from the better of pricing each item separately or
auctioning the grand bundle.
Example 1 (PRev “ p2´ op1qqmaxtSRev,BRevu). Consider 2n items:
• A: n items with equal-revenue valuations. va P S fi t1, . . . ,
?
nu, with distribution
Pr rva ě ks “ 1{k @k P S; and
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• B: n items with rare-event valuations. vb P
 
0, αnb
(
, with distribution Pr
“
vb “ αnb
‰ “
n´b , where we set α “ E rvas.
With a partition mechanism, we can obtain expected revenue p1´ o p1qqnα from the items in
A by bundling them together, and also nα from B by selling each item i separately for price
αni. However, selling all the items separately achieves negligible revenue on A, whereas the
items in B will have negligible contribution to the revenue from selling the grand bundle.
Remark 1. We remark that the Example 1 shows, in particular, a p2´ o p1qq-gap between
max tSRev,BRevu and Rev. Previously Babaioff et al. [2] cited an example due to [7] that
gave a 1.05-gap.
The example above builds on the key intuition from [14, 2] that there is an interest-
ing tradeoff between bundling and selling separately: when most revenue is distributed
among many low-impact, high probability events (as in subset A), their sum concentrates
and bundling is preferable; when most revenue comes from rare events (as in subset B), we
want to sell the items separately. [14, 2] call this the core-tail decomposition.
A nice question suggested to us by Amos Fiat is whether this is the “only way” that
PRev can beat max tSRev,BRevu. In particular, is there always a revenue-maximizing
partition mechanism with at most one non-trivial bundle? The following example shows that
the answer is no.
Example 2 (Two non-trivial bundles). Consider the following valuations:
• for i P t1, 2u, let Pr rvi “ 1s “ Pr rvi “ 2s “ 1{2;
• for i “ t3, 4u, let p1{9q ¨ Pr rvi “ 1s “ Pr rvi “ 10s “ 1{10.
The unique optimal partition mechanism offers bundle t1, 2u for price 3 and bundle t3, 4u for
price 11. The revenue obtained is
3 ¨ Pr
»
– ÿ
iPt1,2u
vi ě 3
fi
fl` 11 ¨ Pr
»
– ÿ
iPt3,4u
vi ě 11
fi
fl “ 3 ¨ 3
4
` 11 ¨ 19
100
“ 4.34.
The core-tail intuition from [14, 2] cannot explain the success of the optimal partition
in Example 2. For this distribution, the optimal partition exploits the fact that the values
of the bundles are slightly more likely to come out 3 and 11, respectively, than other values
on the equal-revenue curve. But they are still far from concentration around 3 and 11. Our
NP-hardness result constructs gadgets that generalize Example 2 to create instances where
the optimal partition exhibits an arbitrarily complex structure.
Our PTAS is more intricate. Let us informally sketch the main idea. In Example 2,
something interesting happens at 3, and something interesting happens at 11. In general,
many interesting events can happen in different locations on the (positive) real numbers line,
but one of the following two always holds:
• The interesting events are far apart on the real line - in this case we don’t lose much by
ignoring the events that pertain to lower values. In terms of Example 2, we exploit the
asymmetry between the bundle t1, 2u and the bundle t3, 4u.
• Most of the action is restricted to a small interval - this is a redundancy we can exploit.
For example, because the sum of many independent random variables in the same range
should concentrate.
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More concretely, we prove (Lemmata 1 and 2) that there exists a near-optimal partition
mechanism that uses only a constant number of non-trivial bundles. In some sense this is a
bicreteria-approximation variant of Fiat’s conjecture that Example 1 is the only reason we
would want to use a partition other max tSRev,BRevu. We then build on the same intuition
to construct modified valuations that approximate the original distributions. Finally, we show
that the new distributions admit a succinct representation, so we can find a near-optimal
partition mechanism by brute-force search.
For completeness, let us conclude this technical exposition with two examples that separate
DRev from PRev; they serve to remind us that there are many interesting mechanisms
beyond the scope of partition mechanisms considered in this paper. The first example shows
a constant separation in our setting of a single additive buyer.
Example 3 (Hart and Nisan [9]; PRev “ p1´Ωp1qqDRev). Consider two i.i.d. items with
valuations sampled uniformly from t0, 1, 2u. The expected revenue for selling the bundle with
both items (for any price) is at most 1; and selling each item separately (for any price) yields
total revenue at most 4{3. Going beyond partition mechanisms, we can offer either item for
price 2, or the grand bundle for price 3. The revenue obtained from this auction is
3 ¨ Pr
»
– ÿ
iPt1,2u
vi ě 3
fi
fl` 2 ¨ Pr rtv1, v2u “ t2, 0us “ 3 ¨ 3
9
` 2 ¨ 2
9
“ 13{9 ą 4{3.
The second example shows that with many buyers, partition mechanisms cannot achieve
any constant fraction of the optimum revenue. See also the recent paper by Yao [17] on
constructing different simple mechanisms in this setting.
Example 4 (e.g. [2]; Many buyers: PRev “ op1qDRev). We consider n items and m “ n1{4
buyers; we let vji denote buyer j’s value for item i. All v
j
i are drawn i.i.d. from the following
distribution: with probability 1´n´3{4, vji “ 0; otherwise, vij is drawn from an equal-revenue
distribution with support
 
1, . . . , n1{10
(
, i.e. Pr
”
v
j
i ě k
ı
“ n´3{4{k.
For any one buyer, selling item i for price k yields revenue n´3{4, which is only an
O p1{ log nq-fraction of the expected value; but the total expected value for the grand bundle
concentrates, so that revenue can easily be obtained. With m buyers, the auctioneer can
guarantee almost the entire social welfare with the following mechanism: approach buyers
in any order; for each buyer charge slightly lower than her expected value for the remain-
ing items, and let her choose her favorite n1{4 items. With a partition mechanism, on the
other hand, we must fix the partition without knowing which items each buyer wants. Thus
partition mechanisms can guarantee at most an O p1{ log nq-fraction of the optimum revenue.
5 NP-hardness
Theorem 1. Given an explicit description of a product distribution of item valuations, com-
puting a revenue maximizing partition is strongly NP-hard.
Proof. We reduce from 3D-Matching: Given sets X,Y,Z and a set of hyperedgesH Ď XˆY ˆ
Z, find a maximum 3-dimensional matching, i.e. maximum non-intersecting subset M Ď H.
Karp [13] proved that it is NP-complete to decide whether there exists a perfect matching
(i.e. |M | “ |X| “ |Y | “ |Z|).
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Construction Identify the set of items with the set of vertices I fi X Y Y Y Z. Identify
the set of hyperedges with their indices; for each h P H, let πh fi |H|6 ` |H|3 ¨ h. Let
πmin fi minhPH πh “
ˇˇ
H6
ˇˇ
and πmax fi maxhPH πh “
´
1`O
´
1{ |H|2
¯¯ ˇˇ
H6
ˇˇ
, For each item i,
the distribution of valuations Di is defined by the πh’s of its hyperedges. Specifically, we let
supp pDiq “ t1u Y tπh : h Q iu and Pr
vi„Di
rvi ě πhs “ 1{πh.
Observe that selling each item separately, for any price in its support, yields expected
revenue of 1 per item.
Completeness If there exists a perfect matching M , we partition according to this match-
ing, and set the price for bundle h at πh ` 2. For each bundle, we have
Pr
«ÿ
iPh
vi ě πh ` 2
ff
“ 1´ p1´ 1{πhq3 “ 3{πh ´ 3{π2h ` 1{π3h.
The expected revenue for each bundle is therefore
pπh ` 2q
`
3{πh ´ 3{π2h ` 1{π3h
˘ “ 3` 3{πh ´O `1{π2h˘
Summing over |M | hyperedges (i.e. |M | bundles), we guarantee a total revenue of OPT fi
|M | `3` 3{πmax ´O `1{π2max˘˘.
Soundness We first claim that there exists an optimum partition where every bundle is
contained in a hyperedge. Let B be a bundle sold for some price π ě πmin. Clearly π ď
|B|πmax, otherwise it never sells. Similarly, we have π ď |B| ` πmax, otherwise it sells with
probability at most |B| {π2min, yielding revenue |B|π{π2min ! 1.
Let i P B be such that π R
”
πh ´ |H|2 , πh ` |H|2
ı
for all h Q i. We compare the revenue
from selling B for price π to the revenue from selling Bz tiu for price π´1. If B sells for price
π but Bz tiu does not sell for price π´ 1, then at least one of the following must be true: (1)
vi ě π ´ |B|, which by our assumption on i implies vi ě π ` |H|2; or (2) vi ą 1 and there is
some other j P B such that vj ą 1. We bound the probability of the union as follows:
1. Pr
”
vi ě π ` |H|2
ı
ď 1
π`|H|2
; the revenue loss is bounded by π
π`|H|2
ď π´|H|2{2
π
;
2. Pr rpvi ą 1q ^ pDj P B vj ą 1qs ă |B|π2
min
; the revenue loss is bounded by π|B|
π2
min
ď 2|B|
π
.
There is also some revenue loss from the decrease in price: the original bundle sells with
probability at most |B|
π´|B| ď 2|B|π ; since we decrease the price by 1, 2|B|π also bounds the
expected loss in revenue. The total expected loss in revenue is therefore at most π´|H|
2{2
π
`
4|B|
π
ă 1, so selling B as a bundle cannot be optimal.
There is an optimum partition that bundles items according to hyperedges in some partial
matching M 1, and the rest of the items are in bundles of size at most two. The optimal price
for a bundle of two items from hyperedge h is πh`1; the probability of selling for this price is
1´ p1´ 1{πhq2 “ 2{πh ´ π2h. Multiplying by πh ` 1, we get an expected revenue of 2` 1{πh.
In particular, this is only p1` 1{2πhq per item, as opposed to p1` 1{πhq per item with a full
hyperedge.
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6 PTAS
Theorem 2. For any constant δ ą 0, there exists a deterministic polynomial time algorithm
that, given an explicit description of a product distribution of item valuations, computes a
partition and prices that generate a p1´ δq-approximation to the maximum revenue obtainable
by partition mechanisms.
Proof outline In the next two subsections we prove a structural characterization of near
optimal auctions: Lemmata 1 and 2 imply that there exists a near-optimal partition mech-
anism that uses only a constant number of non-trivial bundles (i.e. bundles with more than
one item). Furthermore, the prices to these bundles are all within a constant factor, and all
these bundles sell for these prices with constant probability.
In Subsection 6.3 we use our insight about the structure of near-optimal auctions to show
that for optimizing over this restricted class of partitions, most of the information in the
distribution is redundant. In particular we can place every item in one of O plog nq buckets,
where the items within each bucket are indistinguishable for the algorithm. For each bucket,
there are constantly-many options to approximately partition the identical items among con-
stantly many bundles (or to be sold separately). We can enumerate over all approximate
partitions for all buckets in polynomial time.
See also description of the algorithm in Subsection 6.4.
6.1 Singletons
Given the following lemma, we can assume wlog that every non-trivial bundle sells with
probability at least ǫ.
Lemma 1. For any δ ą 0, let ǫ ď δ3{4. Let B Ď rns be a bundle of items, and let πB P R`
be an optimal price for B. Suppose that the revenue from auctioning B for price πB is ǫ ¨ πB,
i.e. Pr rřiPB vi ě πBs “ ǫ. Then the revenue from selling the items in B separately is at least
p1´ δq ¨ ǫ ¨ πB.
Proof. For the proof of this lemma, we simplify notation by normalizing to πB “ 1.
Below we prove that most of the revenue comes from the item with the highest value (this
may be a different item in each realization). In particular, if the total value of the bundle is
at least 1, then it is likely that there is a single item whose value is almost 1,
Pr
«
max
iPB
vi ě 1´ δ{2 |
ÿ
iPB
vi ě 1
ff
ě 1´ δ{2. (1)
This means in particular that Pr rmaxiPB vi ě 1´ δ{2s ě p1´ δ{2q ǫ, and therefore selling
each item separately for price p1´ δ{2q guarantees a p1´ δ{2q2 ě p1´ δq-fraction of the
revenue from selling B as a bundle.
We now prove (1). Since 1 is an optimal price for B, we have that the Pr rřiPB vi ě δ{4s ď
ǫ{ pδ{4q, otherwise δ{4 would have been a better price. What is the probability that there
exist a partition B “ S Y T such that řiPS vi ě δ{2 and řiPT vi ě δ{2? If we were to fix any
partition B “ U Y V before observing the realizations, or to pick one uniformly at random,
we would have
Pr
«˜ÿ
iPU
vi ě δ{4
¸
^
˜ÿ
iPV
vi ě δ{4
¸ff
ď pǫ{ pδ{4qq2 .
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Now assume that there exist some partition pS, T q as above, and pick pU, V q uniformly
at random. With probability at least 1{4 we have that řiPpSXV q vi ě řiPpSXUq vi andř
iPpTXV q vi ď
ř
iPpTXUq vi; and the same for the event that
ř
iPpSXV q vi ě
ř
iPpSXUq vi andř
iPpTXV q vi ď
ř
iPpTXUq vi. Thus with probability at least 1{2,
min
#ÿ
iPU
vi,
ÿ
iPV
vi
+
ě min
#ÿ
iPS
vi,
ÿ
iPT
vi
+
{2.
Therefore the probability that there exist such pS, T q is at most 2 pǫ{ pδ{4qq2.
Observe that whenever
ř
iPB vi ě 1 and maxiPB vi ă 1´δ{2, there exists a partition pS, T q
as above: Let S “ targmaxiPB viu and T “ BzS; if maxiPB vi ě δ{2, we’re done. Otherwise,
move items from T to S until
ř
iPS vi ě δ{2; since the last item we moved from S to T had
value at most maxiPB vi ă δ{2, we have
ř
iPT vi ě 1´ δ ą δ{2. Therefore,
Pr
«
max
iPB
vi ă 1´ δ{2 |
ÿ
iPB
vi ě 1
ff
ď Pr rpmaxiPB vi ă 1´ δ{2q ^ p
ř
iPB vi ě 1qs
Pr rřiPB vi ě 1s ď
32ǫ
δ2
.
Plugging in δ “ 4ǫ1{3 yields (1).
6.2 Bundles
Lemma 2. For any constants 0 ă ǫ ď 1{2 and δ ą 0 we can replace all the bundles that
sell with probability at least ǫ with ℓ “ poly p1{ǫ, 1{δq bundles, while maintaining a p1´ 2δq-
fraction of the expected revenue.
Proof. In Claim 1 we show that we can recursively combine bundles until in any interval of
multiplicative-constant-length rǫ ¨ π, πs, there is at most a constant (k “ 8ǫ´4δ´3) number
of bundles. Then, in Claim 2 we show that we can ignore all bundles except those in some
slightly larger interval rη ¨ π, πs (for η “ δ4ǫ5 p1´ ǫq). This is a union of logǫ η ď log δ
4ǫ4p1´ǫq
log ǫ
smaller intervals rǫ ¨ π, πs; together with the sparsity we obtained in Claim 1, this implies that
we are left with at most ℓ “ k logǫ η bundles.
Claim 1. For any ǫ, δ ą 0, let k “ 8ǫ´4δ´3. Consider only bundles Bi that sell for price πi
with probability at least ǫ. Partition the positive reals into multiplicative intervals rǫ ¨ π, πs.
Consider k separate bundles B1, . . . , Bk with prices π1, . . . , πk in the same interval rǫ ¨ π, πs,
and associated probabilities of selling p1, . . . , pk. Whenever we encounter such a k-tuple, we
combine them into one bundle B1 with price π1 “ ři pi ¨ πi and probability p1 “ 1. Recurse
until every interval has at most k bundles. (The number of bundles decreases at each step,
so this process is guaranteed to terminate.) Finally, discount all newly formed bundles by a
factor of p1´ δ{2q.
Then every newly formed bundle sells with probability at least 1´ δ{2. In particular, this
guarantees an p1´ δq approximation to the original revenue.
Proof. Let B1 “ ŤBi be any newly formed bundle, where Bi’s, πi’s, and pi’s are the original
bundles, prices and probabilities (i.e. B1 may denote a union of union of bundles). Let vBi
denote the random variable vBi fi
ř
jPBi
vj ; let also vˆBi fi min tvBi , πiu. Then we have
E
«ÿ
i
vˆBi
ff
ě
ÿ
i
pi ¨ πi and Var
«ÿ
i
vˆBi
ff
ď
ÿ
i
π2i .
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Applying Chebyshev’s inequality,
Pr
«ÿ
i
vˆBi ď p1´ δ{2q
ÿ
i
pi ¨ πi
ff
ď
ř
π2i`
δ
2
¨ři pi ¨ πi˘2 .
In the last union that formed B1, we combined at least k bundles, each with piπi P
“
ǫ2π, π
‰
.
Therefore, ř
iPrks π
2
i´
δ
2
¨řiPrks pi ¨ πi¯2
ď
ř
iPrks π
2´
δ
2
¨řiPrks ǫ2π¯2
ď 4
δ2kǫ4
.
Plugging in k “ 8ǫ´4δ´3 ě ´ ln pδ{2q ¨ p4ǫ´4δ´2q guarantees that we sell the grand bundle
with probability at least 1´ δ{2.
Claim 2. For any ǫ, δ ą 0, and let η “ δ4ǫ5 p1´ ǫq. Let bundles B1, . . . , Bm, have optimal
prices π1, . . . , πm, and denote π
˚ “ maxiPrms πi. Suppose that bundle Bi sells for price πi with
probability pi ě ǫ, for every i P rms. Suppose further that in each range rǫπ, πs of prices we
have at most k “ ǫ´4δ´3 bundles (this is wlog by the previous claim). Then a p1´ δq-fraction
of the revenue can be obtained by selling only the bundles with with price πi ě ηπ˚.
Proof. k bundles with prices in interval rǫπ, πs can yield at most kπ revenue. Summing over
π P  ηπ˚, ǫ ¨ ηπ˚, ǫ2 ¨ ηπ˚, . . . (, we have that all those bundles together yield revenue at most
kηπ˚{ p1´ ǫq. Plugging in η “ δ4ǫ5 p1´ ǫq completes the proof of the claim.
6.3 Discretization
In this section we consider a sequence of manipulations on the distribution of each item’s
valuations. At the end of the manipulation, every item will fit in one of O plog nq buckets,
with all the items in each bucket having indistinguishable distributions. The first step is to
discretize the valuation distributions:
Definition 1. Let ~D fi
Ś
Di be a valuation distribution over non-negative reals (R`). Let
Nǫ fi t0u Y
!
. . . , p1` ǫq´1 , 1, p1` ǫq , p1` ǫq2 , . . .
)
be a multiplicative-p1` ǫq-net over R`.
For each i, we construct the rounded valuation distribution D
p1q
i as follows: (a) round down
every valuation in the support to the nearest smaller (or equal) element in Nǫ; then (b) round
down every probability of valuation in the new support to the nearest smaller (or equal)
element in Nǫ. Finally, we let ~D
p1q
fi
Ś
D
p1q
i .
The following lemma implies that for sufficiently small ǫ ą 0, the loss in revenue from
rounding the valuations is negligible.
Lemma 3. For any constant ǫ ą 0, non-negative product distribution ~D, and price π, we
have
Pr
~vp1q„ ~Dp1q
”ÿ
v
p1q
i ě p1´ δq π
ı
ě p1´ δq Pr
~v„ ~D
”ÿ
vi ě π
ı
, (2)
where δ fi 2ǫ1{3.
Proof. Rounding the valuations to Nǫ can decrease the sum by a factor of at most p1` ǫq.
Rounding the probabilities is slightly trickier. An equivalent way of formulating the rounded
valuation distribution is to sample ~v „ ~D, round down the valuation of each item to Nǫ, and
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then zero the valuation of each item independently with probability at most ǫ. Inequality (2)
now follows from
Pr
~v„ ~D
”ÿ
v
p1q
i ě p1´ δq π |
ÿ
vi ě π
ı
ě 1´ δ.
In particular, it suffices to show that for every ~v such that
ř
vi ě π,
Pr
~vp1q
”ÿ
v
p1q
i ě p1´ δq π | ~v
ı
ě 1´ δ, (3)
where the randomness is only over the independent zeroing of each valuation.
Fix any such ~v and let π~v fi
ř
vi ě π. The expectation of the sum is at least E
”ř
v
p1q
i
ı
ě
p1´ ǫq2 π~v, and the variance is at most ǫ ¨ p1´ ǫq2 π2~v . Therefore by Chebyshev’s inequality,
Pr
”ÿ
v
p1q
i ď p1´ δq π~v
ı
ď ǫpδ{2q2 .
Plugging in δ “ 2ǫ1{3 completes yields (3).
Recall that we can assume wlog that all our bundles sell with constant probability for
prices in rǫπ, πs (Lemma 2). Thus, for the purpose of (approximately) evaluating an item’s
contribution to any bundle it suffices to consider only its valuations in
“
π{n2, π‰, rounding
down larger valuations to π and ignoring smaller. Notice that the new support has size at
most logarithmic:
ˇˇ
Nǫ X
“
π{n2, π‰ˇˇ “ O plog nq. Similarly, for the purpose of bundling, we can
assume wlog that every valuation in the support has probability at least 1{n2. Now each value
in the support is associated with one of
ˇˇ
Nǫ X
“
1{n2, 1‰ˇˇ “ O plog nq potential probabilities.
In order to represent each item we need to know one more number - the revenue it
can generate when sold separately. Here again we can assume wlog that this revenue is in“
π{n2, π‰: if it is less than π{n2, its revenue is negligible and we never want to sell this item
separately; if it is greater than π, we always want to sell this item separately. The revenue
from selling an item separately is a product of two numbers (price and probability) in Nǫ,
and therefore also belongs to Nǫ. As before, this means that we can assume wlog that the
expected revenue takes one of
ˇˇ
Nǫ X
“
π{n2, π‰ˇˇ “ O plog nq values.
So far for each item we need O plog nq numbers, each from a set of size O plog nq. While
this is much more succinct than the naive representation, it is still not good enough for our
algorithmic application (at this point we still need plog nqOplognq " n buckets). In the next
two steps we reduce to only three numbers from sets of size O plog nq: first, we show that
in the lower end of the support it suffices to keep the aggregate expectation rather than
probability of each value; second, we argue that we can assume wlog that all the high values
in the support have approximately the same probability; and the third number is the expected
revenue from selling separately.
Low values
Fix any ǫ ą 0, distribution Dp1qi over R`, and π P R`. Define
v
p2q
i fi
#
v
p1q
i v
p1q
i ě ǫπ
E
u„D
p1q
i
ru | u ă ǫπs vp1qi ă ǫπ
;
round down the new value and probability to the nearest smaller elements in Nǫ, and let ~D
p2q
i
denote the resulting new distribution.
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Intuitively, it may be helpful to think of ~Dp2q as “erasing” or “blurring” the information
about ~Dp1q below ǫπ. Notice that for any ǫ ą 0, E
v
p2q
i
„D
p2q
i
”
v
p2q
i
ı
“ E
v
p1q
i
„D
p1q
i
”
v
p1q
i
ı
. The next
lemma shows that ~Dp2q also generates approximately the same revenue.
Lemma 4. Let ǫ ą 0, let δ “ 2ǫ1{3, and let ~Dp1q be a product distribution. Then,
Pr
~vp1q„ ~Dp1q
”ÿ
v
p1q
i ě π
ı
´2δ ď Pr
~vp2q„ ~Dp2q
”ÿ
v
p2q
i ě p1´ δq π
ı
´δ ď Pr
~vp1q„ ~Dp1q
”ÿ
v
p1q
i ě p1´ 2δq π
ı
.
Recall that by Lemma 1, we can assume wlog that all bundles sell with probability Ω p1q;
thus we can tolerate the above additive loss in probability.
Proof. By Chebyshev’s inequality, the sum of valuations less than ǫπ is within an additive
˘δπ of its expectation with probability at least 1 ´ δ (and the rest of the valuations don’t
change at all).
High values
For any ǫ ą 0, a rounded distribution Dp2qi (in the sense of Definition 1), and π P R`, let
p˚i fi maxvPrǫπ,πs Pru„Dp2q
i
ru “ vs denote the most likely valuation in rǫπ, πs. Let Lǫ
D
p2q
i
denote
the set of unlikely high valuations:
Lǫ
D
p2q
i
fi
#
v : Pr
u„D
p2q
i
ru “ vs ă ǫ4p˚i
+
X rǫπ, πs
Let D
p3q
i denote the restriction of D
p2q
i to supp
!
D
p2q
i
)
zLǫ
D
p2q
i
:
v
p3q
i fi
$&
%
v
p2q
i v
p2q
i R LǫDp2q
i
0 v
p2q
i P LǫDp2q
i
.
The following lemma implies that for each i it suffices to maintain p˚i (which always takes
one of
ˇˇ
Nǫ X
“
1{n2, 1‰ˇˇ “ O plog nq values), and a constant number of bits for each of the
(constantly many) values in supp
!
D
p3q
i
)
X rǫπ, πs.
Lemma 5. Let ~Dp2q be a rounded product distribution of valuations of items in B. Assume
that selling bundle B for price π yields higher expected revenue than selling all the items in
B separately. Then,
Pr
~vp3q„ ~Dp3q
«ÿ
iPB
v
p3q
i ě π
ff
ě p1´ δq Pr
~vp2q„ ~Dp2q
«ÿ
iPB
v
p2q
i ě π
ff
.
Proof. We compare, for each item i, the potential revenue loss from switching from D
p2q
i to
D
p3q
i to the expected revenue from selling i separately. We argue that for each i, the latter is
much larger. Summing over all items, we have that the total loss is much smaller than the
total revenue from selling every item separately. By the premise, the latter is less than the
original revenue from selling the bundle.
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By definition, item i has probability at least p˚i of having value ǫπ. Thus we can obtain
revenue at least p˚i ¨ǫπ from selling it for price ǫπ. In contrast, every time we zero a valuation,
we could potentially lose revenue π. The total probability over items in Lǫ
D
p2q
i
is
ˇˇˇ
ˇLǫDp2q
i
ˇˇˇ
ˇ ǫ4p˚i .
Between ǫπ and π, there are at most ´ log ǫ{ log p1` ǫq ă 1{ǫ2 elements in Nǫ; in particular,ˇˇˇ
ˇLǫDp2q
i
ˇˇˇ
ˇ ă 1{ǫ2. Therefore, the revenue lost is at most an ǫ-fraction of the revenue from selling
i separately.
From QPTAS to PTAS
We have reduced the representation of each item to three numbers in Nǫ X
“
π{n2, π‰: the
expectation over lower values, E
u„D
p3q
i
ru | u ă ǫπs (rounded down to Nǫ); the quantity p˚i ¨π,
where p˚i fi maxvPrǫπ,πsPru„Dp3q
i
ru “ vs is the maximum probabilities over higher values; and
the maximum revenue from selling i separately, SRev pDiq. (For the higher values we also
need a constant number of bits to specify which values have probabilities close to p˚i , and
how close.) At this point we need O
`
log3 n
˘
buckets, which would suffice for obtaining a
Quasi-PTAS.
Our final step is to observe that if any of those three numbers is much lower than the
maximum of the three, it might as well be zero. If Eu„Di ru | u ă ǫπs is much higher than p˚i ¨π,
then it’s contribution to revenue for any bundle outweighs the contribution from any of the
higher values appearing with very low probability; similarly if Eu„Di ru | u ă ǫπs " SRev pDiq
we would always sell item i as part of one of the bundles. If SRev pDǫi q is much higher than
either of the other two, then the contribution from selling item i separately outweighs the
contribution (from the lower values, higher values, or both) to the revenue from any bundle.
Finally, since SRev pDiq ě p˚i ǫπ, the revenue from selling separately is never much lower than
the higher values’ contribution.
6.4 Algorithm
We achieve a p1´ δq-approximation of the optimal partition revenue for some constant δ ą 0;
let ǫ “ ǫ pδq ą 0 be a sufficiently small constant, and let
Nǫ fi t0u Y
!
. . . , p1` ǫq´1 , 1, p1` ǫq , p1` ǫq2 , . . .
)
.
For each item i, compute the optimum expected revenue from selling i separately, SRev pDiq.
Before we analyze bundles, we first want to guess a range rǫπ, πs in which all the bundle
prices will lie. Let vmin denote the minimum over all nonzero values in the support of all
items, and let vmax denote the sum, over all items, of the maximal values in their supports.
An optimal π must belong to
“
vmin, vmax
‰
. Enumerate over all potential π’s in Nǫ. By Lemma
2 for some choice of π, it suffices to optimize only over partitions with a constant number of
non-trivial bundles, and each of those bundles sells for prices in rǫπ, πs with probability at
least ǫ. For the rest of the algorithm assume we have such an optimal choice of π.
For each i, round Di as in Definition 1, and let ~D
p1q denote the resulting product distri-
bution. ( ~Dp1q is stochastically dominated by ~D, thus the revenue obtained from a partition
mechanism with valuations drawn from ~Dp1q is at most the revenue obtained with the same
partition and pricing with valuations drawn from ~D. In the other direction, Lemma 3 guar-
antees that the revenue lost is at most a small constant fraction.)
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For each i, replace all values in
“
0, ǫ2π
‰
with their expectation, and let ~Dp2q denote the
resulting product distribution. (By Lemma 4, optimizing over bundles with prices in rǫπ, πs
with valuations drawn from ~Dp2q is the same up to a small constant factor as with valuations
drawn from ~Dp1q.)
For each i, let p˚i denote the maximal probability D
p2q
i gives to any value in
“
ǫ2π, π
‰
.
Remove values with probabilities much smaller than p˚i from the support of D
p2q
i , and let
~Dp3q denote the resulting product distribution. ( ~Dp3q is stochastically dominated by ~Dp2q,
thus the revenue obtained from a partition mechanism with valuations drawn from ~Dp3qis at
most the revenue obtained with the same partition and pricing with valuations drawn from
~Dp2q. In the other direction, Lemma 5 guarantees that the revenue lost is at most a small
constant fraction.)
For each i, we now have three variables which may be of different scale: SRev pDiq,
E
u„D
p3q
i
“
u | u ă ǫ2π‰, and p˚i ¨π; we also have the full description of Dp3qi restricted to “ǫ2π, π‰,
which given p˚i requires only a constant number of bits. If any of the three variables is much
smaller than any of the others, set the smaller variable to zero.
We now represent each item with a constant number of variables, which are all either zero
or within constant factors. In total, we have at most O plog nq distinct representations, which
we henceforth call buckets.
Enumerate over the number of bundles (by Lemma 2 it suffices to consider only numbers
up to some constant ℓ). For each bucket, we must decide how many items to allocate to each
of the ℓ bundles, and which to sell separately. I.e. we must pick some vector in r0, 1sℓ`1, and
up to ˘ǫ, there are at most ǫ´pℓ`1q different vectors; in particular, only a constant number
of choices for each bucket. Enumerate (in polynomial time) over all choices for all O plog nq
buckets.
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